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Abstract We argue that the way in which the concept of expertise is understood
and invoked has prevented progress in the debate as to whether moral philosophers
can be said to be ‘moral experts’. We offer an account of expertise that draws on the
role of tacit knowledge in order to provide a basis upon which the debate can
progress. Our analysis consists of three parts. In the first part we highlight two
specific problems in the way that the concept of expertise has been invoked in the
moral expertise debate, namely the understanding of expertise as an exclusive
concept and the conflation of expertise with the idea of ‘authority’. In the second
part we suggest an alternative way of approaching the concept of expertise. This is
based on Collins and Evans’ sociological theory of expertises. This theory provides
a valuable analytical framework for thinking about claims to expertise and for
drawing the kinds of distinctions which allow for different kinds of moral expertises
and competencies. In the final part, we show how the application of this theory helps
to avoid some of the problematic conclusions which theorists have arrived at to date
and provides a common platform for debate. Ultimately, it permits the argument to
be made that moral philosophers could be considered specialist members of an
expert community of moral decision-makers.
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Introduction
The question of whether moral philosophers, when sitting on ethics committees or
other deliberative bodies charged with making ethical judgements, can be
considered moral experts has resulted in recent answers covering a wide range of
possibilities. While some have strongly rejected the claim that moral philosophers
are moral experts, others have argued that moral philosophers are a form of ‘semi-
expert’. Others still, by contrast, illustrate greater ambivalence on the matter,
whether by highlighting moral expertise as just a desirable possibility, or by
declaring the concept of expertise to be neither useful nor interesting, or by ducking
the ambiguities of what expert status means in favour of exploring whether
philosophers nevertheless can be said to perform a useful role. The argument that
moral philosophers are ‘full’ moral experts in the sense that we attribute expertise to
other professional areas, such as medicine or law, would seem to be rare; perhaps
revealing that most are willing to concede that laypersons possess at least some
relevant insight into moral matters in a way the precludes the identification of a
privileged group of experts on the matter of morals.
While the aim of these debates is to ascertain when and in respect of what we
should prefer the judgment of ‘moral experts’ over that of non-experts, gaining
clarity on these issues in the context of moral matters is seriously hampered by how
expertise is understood and used in the debates. As we will argue, these debates
have accepted and turned upon an elitist conception of expertise which, in turn, has
led to some rather implausible, if not unhelpful claims about moral expertise and the
role of moral philosophers on deliberative bodies. The result is confused and
clashing positions regarding the expertise of moral philosophers vis-a`-vis members
of the public.
To resolve the confusion, rather than following the approach of the existing
debates by dwelling on the nature of ethics as the primary focus,1 our analysis takes
the nature of expertise as a point of departure for thinking about moral expertise.
This allows us to consider the question from a different perspective; namely, if this
is what expertise amounts to, are moral philosophers experts in that sense? In order
to answer this, we draw upon a so-called ‘normative theory of expertises’ that has
been developed in science and technology studies. Collins and Evans provide one of
the most complete accounts of expertise by constructing a substantive and multi-
dimensional theory of expertises that links expertise to the acquisition of ‘tacit
knowledge’—the ‘‘knowledge that is not explicated’’, but which still plays a crucial
role in all meaningful human activities. While tacit knowledge is of great
importance for ‘deep understanding’ and mastering of specialist skills in domains
such as high energy physics or moral philosophy, it is just as vital in mastering
1 Such as we might find in, e.g., where the objectivity of moral theory, the nature of moral experience and
moral wisdom are all central to the determination of expertise.
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ubiquitous skills such walking on a crowded pavement or riding a bicycle in traffic.
As we shall demonstrate, linking expertise to different bodies of tacit knowledge—
such as domain-specific or widely distributed (even ubiquitous) tacit knowledge—
makes it possible to attribute different forms of expertises to different social groups
(depending on what form of tacit knowledge they can draw upon). Using such a
framework in the context of the debates about moral expertise allows us to describe
what sort of expertises moral philosophers as well as lay members of the public
possess in respect of moral matters.
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part we highlight two specific
problems in the way that the concept of expertise has been invoked in the moral
expertise debate, namely the understanding of expertise as an exclusive concept and
the conflation of expertise with the idea of ‘authority’. In the second part we outline
important aspects of Collins and Evans’ theory of expertises. This theory of
expertises provides a valuable analytical framework for thinking about claims to
expertise and for drawing the kinds of distinctions which allow for different kinds of
moral expertises and competencies. Finally, we show how the application of this
theory helps to avoid some of the problematic conclusions which theorists have
arrived at to date and provides a common platform for debate. Ultimately, it permits
the argument to be made that moral philosophers could be considered specialist
members of an expert community of moral decision-makers. Such a specialism
might consist of technical skills that allow moral philosophers to answer certain
questions about the nature of morality and to provide certain key skills, such as
logical analysis of moral argument, in a way that a lay person may not be able to.
Critically however, what the framework of expertises also allows us to establish is
that possession of such specialism is not the same thing as having a claim to some
exclusive command of a domain of expertise in moral judgement. The non-
exclusive account of expertise we draw from still allows for a much wider pool of
experts in this area. The ultimate factor under consideration is that moral expertise
consists in an ability to determine what to do with our knowledge of moral issues; it
is the ability and capacity to exercise moral judgement rather than the possession of
moral ‘facts’. Accordingly, moral expertise is open to those who are not moral
philosophers in this regard, as well as those who are.
Morality, Authority and the Misconception of Expertise
Perhaps as a consequence of the roles that moral philosophers perform for
commissions and deliberative bodies, the question of expertise has been framed
narrowly: whether moral philosophers are moral experts. Given that most moral
philosophers undergo specialist training and interact with others in the philosophical
community, with many performing broader consultative roles, one might expect to
find robust justifications to the effect that moral philosophers do possess moral
expertise. However, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, most do not claim this. The
peculiar nature of this position was noted by Peter Singer when he considered
common assertions to the effect that ‘there is no such thing as moral expertise’ and
that ‘moral philosophers are not moral experts’, leading him to question whether
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philosophers were right to disclaim expertise [17]. Yet several decades later, the
same view dominates; as Archard notes: ‘on the whole moral philosophers are
sceptical about any claim that they possess moral expertise’ [1].
Why moral philosophers should be reluctant to claim moral expertise can be
attributed to the deployment of an under-theorised conception of expertise rather
than innate concerns about the making of moral judgements. Problematic
assumptions about what ‘expertise’ means and the legitimate scope of expert
decision-making authority rest upon two serious misconceptions about expertise:
1. Expertise is treated as conferring absolute authority: This leads to the claim that
having ‘domain-specific expertise’ on a matter—in this case the specific domain
of morality—means that ‘domain-specific experts’ are afforded exclusive
authority to speak on this matter.
2. Expertise is conceptualised as exclusionary and restricted: This is a result of
expertise being equated with elite performance. It also means that many people
engaged in making moral judgements such as novices, lay persons or citizens
cannot be described as having expertise.
We therefore first need to account for these misconceptions about the nature of
expertise before proceeding to a new assessment of what moral expertise amounts to
in the final section.
Misconception 1: Moral Expertise as Absolute Authority
Much of the opposition by moral philosophers to the idea that they might be said to
possess moral expertise can be linked to a concern that this is tantamount to saying
that only moral philosophers can be experts in matters of morality, in the sense of
being able to claim special authority to dictate what, for example, is morally right
or wrong. This concern shapes Archard’s approach to moral expertise: ‘A claim of
moral expertise is a claim to command knowledge in respect of the making of
normative judgments not commanded by others’ ([1], p. 123). Archard then goes on
to argue that philosophers do not have the requisite command in respect of moral
judgments on the grounds that moral philosophers accept and are committed to
some version of common-sense morality, which he defines as—a ‘set of moral
maxims of which ordinary people have knowledge and of which they make use in
their quotidian lives’ ([1], p. 123). As a result, it cannot be claimed that philosophers
are moral experts if they cannot claim to be better than ordinary people in exercising
judgements about morality. Very similar considerations have also led others to
reject or hedge the concept of moral expertise [10]. For example, Cowley argues
that in respect of non-abstract moral quandaries like euthanasia, even if moral
philosophers have greater familiarity with philosophical theory, they are no better
situated than educated laypersons to determine what to do. The main arguments for
and against euthanasia are well-known, of a ‘personal’ nature and ‘not at all the
‘‘property’’ of the philosopher’ [6]. In such cases, Cowley argues, there is no reason
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for affording special weight to a philosopher’s view of what should be done. They,
‘like everyone else’ are invoking ‘second order intuitions to stipulate that one
consideration outweighs the other’ [6]. Few, it is to be expected, would accept the
concept where the effect is to suggest that moral philosophers have ‘privileged
knowledge on what is morally right’ [10]. Yet even the exceptional few who do
argue for moral expertise, notably Singer [17] and Gesang [12], neither venture so
far as to say that moral philosophers possess ‘command knowledge’ in the sense of
telling people what they must do. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any voice claiming
that this is what moral expertise entails. The one notable exception being Gordon,
who asserts, ‘I believe that moral philosophers are moral experts and others should
follow their advice’ although he then goes on to admit that he provides no ‘specific
argument in support of this claim’ ([14], p. 206). Instead, those arguing for moral
expertise create a different picture of what this expertise must be like. Singer, for
example, who considers the skills of moral philosophers, the advantages that their
training provides them with in ‘an understanding of moral concepts and of the logic
of moral argument’ as well as the time afforded to ‘think full-time about moral
issues’, argues that,
[I]t would be surprising if moral philosophers were not, in general, better
suited to arrive at the right, or soundly based, moral conclusions than non-
philosophers ([17], p. 117).
Rather than promoting a ‘command model’ of moral expertise, the emphasis here is
on the kind of processes important to moral decision-making, including deliberation and
reflection. Although some might balk at the idea of there being ‘right’ moral
conclusions, it is reasonable to believe that most would at least subscribe to the view that
some moral conclusions are better formed than others (rather than saying that moral
philosophers are right). Unless one is inclined to believe that we already live in a perfect
society, that anyone’s moral views ‘are as good as anyone else’s’ [17], or that one cannot
improve one’s moral decision-making,2 we might think it possible to say that the special
work that philosophers perform can be constitutive of moral expertise in the sense that
Singer outlines. This does not, however, necessitate saying that moral philosophers are
the authority on morality who can profess what is right; nor importantly, does Singer
suggest this.3
A more nuanced version of this argument emerges from Gesang’s view that moral
philosophers are ‘semi-experts’. Echoing Singer, Gesang argues that ‘moral judgments
from moral philosophers will be better founded and more likely to be right than
judgments from ordinary people’ [12]. While placing strong weight on moral
philosophers’ exclusive knowledge of ethical theories, even Gesang accepts that
‘moral philosophers cannot pronounce absolute wisdom’ or say as a physicist could
‘your opinion is false’ [12]. Key to this is the operation of subjective moral intuitions.
Though moral intuitions fall short of the moral knowledge necessary for a well-founded
2 Although it is recognised that these views do exist and do create some challenging questions as to the
nature of morality. See Cowley [6].
3 Our thanks to Peter Singer for confirming that our interpretation of his work was correct; Singer [18],
February 4). Private Email Correspondence.
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moral judgment, Gesang [12] maintains that they remain a necessary part; he argues that
because moral intuitions are shared by moral philosophers and laypersons, this means
that ‘moral philosophers are ‘‘semi-experts’’’. Rather than arguing that moral
philosophers have exclusive access to knowing what is morally ‘right’, he notes that
‘their judgments can be criticized by any ordinary person who has different intuitions’
but goes on to argue that there are ‘good reasons to take their judgments very seriously
and to have them serve on political committees’. This latter note is significant; despite
the reluctance of some to accept the label of moral expert, most regard moral
philosophers as serving an important role.4 Quite critically, this position is also occupied
by Archard. While maintaining that the moral philosopher’s role ‘should not be that of
invoking his expertise to ensure that what is done follows from his own better moral
judgment of what should be done’, Archard ([1], p. 127) nevertheless argues that:
Rather it ought to be that of advising and of ‘coaching’ non-philosophers,
ensuring that they may come to see why the better judgment is a better
judgment. If that is done conscientiously and successfully, then two desiderata
are served; the better outcome is agreed and a general population is schooled
in those skills that ensure they can play their proper part, as good citizens, in
democratic self-government.
Given Archard’s preparedness to say that moral philosophers can help others to
identify better judgments and as such may exercise some form of expertise, Archard’s
view differs little in substance from Singer or Gesang’s. Yet given his rejection of moral
expertise, Archard is undecided on how to package the advisory and coaching capacity
of moral philosophers. He concludes that while they cannot be shown to be moral
experts, ‘the better reason to think they are not shows that they are moral experts only in
a limited sense’ [1]. Overall, his position looks less coherent than that of Gesang’s owing
to the conflation of moral expertise with absolute authority on morality. While we later
discuss the legitimate scope of expert decision-making, for the time being it will suffice
to point to Crosthwaite [8], who notes that while ethicists and moral philosophers serve
an important function in cases of moral uncertainty and conflict, suggesting that some
‘‘expertise’’ is being accessed, the concept of expertise does not, for him, mean that, ‘one
be unchallengeable by those who do not share one’s training’ [8].
Misconception 2: Expertise as Exclusive
While the study of expertise admits of a broader range of ways by which expert status is
socially identified or measured,5 in conventional terms, expertise is understood as
4 For an exception, see Cowley [7].
5 We can point to other factors which are closely associated with expertise; for example, common
markers/signifiers of expertise can include things like credentials, track record and experience but also
sometimes ones like money, success, influence and power. Moreover, expertise can also be highly
associated with ideas of what kinds of skills are of particular social value and/or elite. As such, the label
of expertise tends to be assigned to activities and skills which are not widely practised, to individuals
engaged in highly technical work and high status professions, like medicine or science, rather than
speaking English as a native language or the ability to cycle.
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referring to ‘the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from
novices and less experienced people’ [9]. Typically, the measures for identifying
experts from non-experts centralise either ‘superior’6 or ‘evaluative’7 ability. In
respect of both superiority and evaluative abilities, the approach taken is a relational
(in context of expertise studies, ‘relative’) one where experts are studied in comparison
to novices and the former constitute the more knowledgeable group with a higher level
of proficiency than non-experts. In highly technical domains, where laypersons have
little in the way of skills, knowledge or insight in respect of the work undertaken by
specialists, this relative approach may cause fewer problems in its application.
However, in the case of moral expertise, where every commentator has noted the
presence of ubiquitous skills in the form of ‘common-sense morality’, or ‘subjective
moral intuitions’, the relative model of expertise quickly breaks down. It is in this
respect that most of the engagements with question of moral expertise become
objectionable. The question as to what ‘special skills’ the moral philosopher could
be said to possess gets lost because the issue of possessing some specialist skills in
morality gets conflated with the issue of possessing moral expertise. This is
troublesome because under the relative model, expertise is regarded as an exclusive
matter that only the specialist can possess:
Expertise is exclusionary and restricted. It is the command of knowledge
within a defined domain by some persons that is not commanded by
others ([1], p. 120).
This understanding of expertise has come to define the debate around moral
expertise.8 Under the relative view one is either an expert or one is not; one creates
the other. But on this model it is not always easy to spot who the expert is. In cases
where an activity or body of knowledge is ubiquitous—highly spread across the
general population—the tendency is to think of those activities or knowledge as not
forming the basis of expertise. Furthermore, where there are subtle variations in
competency or variations in how that activity is performed, for example when one is
training to become a doctor, it becomes harder to define when expertise is actually
achieved. This is largely owing to the crudeness of the relative expertise model. It is
typically an all or nothing matter, its principal target is exclusivity, and it possesses
no reliable measures for detecting the presence of subtle differences in competency
or developing expertise. As such, when confronted with subtle differences and
developing capacities in population-wide activity, the model breaks down. Perhaps
for understandable reasons in the face of activities that have strong ubiquitous
elements some are driven to say, ‘there are no experts at all’. In respect of moral
expertise this is just the conclusion which David Archard reached; although the
option he speedily rejected was that everyone could be said to possess expertise:
6 Superiority is evaluated by focusing upon the performance of domain-related tasks, whether by
measuring consistency in the achievement of specific outcomes, such as diagnosis of medical conditions.
7 In respect of evaluative ability, there is broad acceptance that while experts may not always
demonstrate superior ability to perform tasks central to experts, such as selecting stocks or weather
forecasting, ‘the experts are nearly always the best qualified to evaluate their own performance and
explain the reasons for any deviant outcomes’, Ericsson [9].
8 As exemplified by Gordon [14], Cowley [7] and Gesang [12].
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It does not normally make sense to say that everyone is or can be an expert in
some matter. The phrase ‘We are all now experts in X’ is surely typically
employed, somewhat ironically, to indicate the end of expertise and the
‘democratization’ of knowledge in the domain. Recognition of expertise gives
the non-expert a good reason to endorse the judgment of the expert, a judgment
she would not otherwise make or have a good reason to make ([1], p. 120).
Archard’s broader analysis around the moral capacity of laypersons vis-a`-vis the
moral philosopher is both plausible and compelling. It is clear that he sees ordinary
people as holding the capacity to be moral, and it is also clear that he regards moral
philosophers as being engaged in a distinctive range of activities which is socially
valuable in respect of morality. He doesn’t want to deny either of these positions or to
say that moral philosophers are no different to everyone else. What is singularly
responsible for wreaking havoc on the overall reasoning is reliance on a relative model
of expertise. In affording no wiggle room for addressing differences in skill, the choice
appears to be between: declaring the philosopher to be the moral expert or saying that
everyone is a moral expert. For Archard, neither is desirable. The idea that recognising
expertise universally somehow poses dangerous repercussions for society drives a well-
intended critique to the conclusion that ‘there are no ethical experts’ is better. But this
doesn’t stack up; on this model of expertise at least there is no real substantive difference
between saying none of us are experts or all of us are. Either way the conclusion should
be seen as lamentable when most commentators, including Archard, can identify some
kind of specialist skill at play.
It is important to see that the relative model of expertise will always invite us to reach
precisely these kinds of untenable positions. Some, appreciating these problems, have
attempted to identify alternative solutions which avoid the all-or-nothing approach, for
example the idea that moral philosophers might be ‘semi-experts’ [12] but these constitute
ad-hoc revisions of a problematic model and increases the potential for a confused
semantic battle that we should seek to avoid. As we sought to illustrate, even
commentators holding remarkably similar positions have nevertheless clashed on the
question of moral expertise. The key problem which afflicts all of these approaches is how
expertise has come to be understood. Given the importance of subjective moral intuition
and laypersons capacity to develop better moral judgment, where expertise is understood
as entailing moral exclusivity and moral authority, most moral philosophers will be driven
to the conclusion that there is no such thing as ‘moral expertise’ or ‘moral experts’. This is
not a helpful way of identifying what moral philosophers are specialist at, why we should
listen to them and in respect of what matters they can be said to ‘know what they are
talking about’. What is clear is that we need a different set of tools by which to evaluate
specialism. For this, we turn to consider the vehicle that will take us forward.
The New Sociology of Expertises
Collins and Evans’ theory of expertises has been formulated in the context of
debates about expertise in the field of science and technology studies (STS) [3].
Their conception of expertises can, however, also contribute something to the
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philosophical debate about ‘moral expertise’ as it avoids the two misconceptions
about expertise worked out in the previous sections. The cornerstone of Collins and
Evans’ sociological conception of expertise is to link the acquisition of expertise to
the acquisition of tacit knowledge relevant to particular domains. This means that
those who possess the tacit knowledge relevant to a domain can be regarded as
experts. Tacit knowledge is a challenging concept to precisely define but it refers to
knowledge that is not and, to some extent, cannot be made explicit [2]. By contrast
with explicit knowledge, which can be expressed in formal language and shared
through texts, manuals or explanation, tacit knowledge is difficult to formalise. It
relates to the numerous ‘unwritten’ rules and areas of discretionary judgement that
operate within every domain of human activity. As Nonaka et al. [15] note, tacit
knowledge is ‘deeply rooted in action, procedures, routines, commitment, ideals,
values and emotions’ and describes an ‘analogue process that requires a kind of
‘simultaneous processing’. It is the knowledge that makes the deep understanding of
explicit knowledge possible. It is the knowledge that enables us to apply explicit
knowledge in new situations and under changing circumstances. It is also the
knowledge that makes the acquisition and the appropriate use of explicit knowledge
possible. While it cannot be directly observed, tacit knowledge manifests itself in
people’s abilities. Without the ability to talk or to act in a way that indicates to
others that a person knows what she is talking about or is doing, there is no point in
calling someone an expert.9 One crucial aspect of tacit knowledge is that it is to
some extent a collective property, which means that bodies of tacit knowledge are
‘developed’ and ‘maintained’ within social groups [4]. The only known way for an
individual to tap into these group-specific ‘reservoirs’ of tacit knowledge is to
actively immerse themselves into a social group that possesses it.
This has profound consequences for the distribution of expertises within
societies, thereby challenging the idea that expertise is necessarily something
exclusive. If it is accepted that tacit knowledge is involved in every meaningful or
intentional human practice [5] then this allows for ‘ubiquitous expertises’ related to
domains are accessible to everyone (or ubiquitous). An example of the former is the
ability to speak a natural language which is a tacit knowledge laden activity.10
Everyone, or almost everyone, in the United Kingdom can learn to speak English
fluently by just living in the country and interacting with other English language
speakers on a regular basis. Thus, the ability to speak English in the UK is
ubiquitous but since it is a tacit knowledge laden activity, it is also recognised as a
domain of expertise by Collins and Evans’ theory of expertises.11
Of course not every skill is widely distributed in a society. Accordingly, Collins
and Evans [3, 4] distinguish between ‘ubiquitous expertises’ and ‘specialist
9 The importance of language is stressed by Collins [2]; see also [16]. It has to be pointed out that not all
people who are able to do something expertly are able to talk about it in a way that reflects their
expertness; to be able express oneself adequately requires ‘interactive ability’ [4].
10 If it was not than we should already be surrounded by robots that speak natural languages fluently or
we should have translating devices (such as Google translate) that actually work perfectly.
11 Note that speaking English fluently is considered to be a specialist skill in non-English speaking
countries such as Spain or Italy.
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expertises’.12 Specialist expertises are related to ‘domains of knowledge’ which
form around particular activities and are associated with particular subgroups of
larger collectives. Scientific disciplines are paradigmatic examples of such ‘domains
of knowledge’, but in principle any meaningful activity that is not widely shared
might be regarded as a ‘domain’ that may give rise to specialist expertises. For
example, to become a competent astrophysicist, it is not sufficient to just live in a
country where astrophysics is practised by a subset of the population. What is
needed to gain ‘fluency’ is to immerse oneself into the community of astrophys-
icists, either by enrolling in a University course and then working in the field or by
talking to astrophysicists on a regular basis about domain-relevant ‘stuff’.13
By accommodating ubiquitous and specialist forms of expertises, Collins and
Evans’ theory avoids creating an exclusionary concept of expertise. Their
conception of expertise also avoids establishing a fixed connection between
expertise and decision-making authority. That means that in cases where specialist
expert knowledge is considered to be relevant for wider society-affecting decisions,
overall decision-making authority is not simply afforded to experts. Collins and
Evans’ [3, 4] theory of expertise only states that whilst technical expertise possesses
authority in respect of technical matters, it does not hold determinative authority in
respect of broader policy decisions (that deploy technical knowledge) which ought
to be made by the appropriate policy-making institutions. They therefore distinguish
between a ‘technical’ and a ‘political’ phase of decision-making [11].
Rethinking Moral Expertise
While the work flowing from the theory of expertise is far richer and more extensive
than we can capture here, the aim has been to introduce the key driver for rethinking
how expertise might be captured in the case of the moral philosopher’s role when it
comes to making ethical judgements on deliberative bodies. At the heart of the
theory of expertise sits tacit knowledge and its concomitant means of determining
what it is that generates expertise in any given domain of knowledge. In applying
this account of expertise to the case of moral decision-making, it is apparent that it
is neither necessary nor sufficient that one is a moral philosopher in order to make a
12 The distinction between ubiquitous and specialist expertise has mainly heuristic value. The boundary
between the two is fluid and fuzzy and depends on the frame of reference. For example, the ability to
speak English fluently is ‘ubiquitous’ if only the population of the UK is considered. In the context of
talking about the entire human population, speaking English is an ability of a certain sub-population and
is therefore not ‘ubiquitous’. Similarly, while writing can be considered to be a ubiquitous skill in present-
day Britain, only a few 100 years ago, writing was considered to be skill mastered only by some in the
UK. Moreover, in some parts of the world, the ability to write is still not ubiquitous.
13 That the latter is possible has been demonstrated by Harry Collins, who has, in his role as sociologist
of science, immersed himself for three decades into the community of gravitational wave physicists and
talked to many practitioners [13]. While Collins is unable to ‘do’ gravitational wave physics, he has
gained enough fluency in gravitational wave physics to become talk about aspects of it in a way that
makes him indistinguishable from trained gravitational wave physicists. Note that in contrast to talking to
those who possess tacit knowledge, reading alone, even reading domain-specific literature, is insufficient
to acquire tacit knowledge needed for the deep understanding of a domain as tacit knowledge cannot be
transferred by means of written text.
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claim of moral expertise. Instead, a number of important clarifications as to the
nature of moral expertise can be made. First, there is such a thing as moral expertise,
both in a ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘specialist’ sense of expertise, as outlined in the previous
section. Second, this is not a blanket claim that everyone is a moral expert or that
everyone’s moral judgements are as good as everyone else’s. Third, moral
philosophers are not precluded from being moral experts; it is just that they do not
possess this attribute simply by virtue of being moral philosophers. Fourth, those
who are not moral philosophers can also lay claim to being moral experts. Fifthly,
because moral decision-making can involve a certain amount of specialist
knowledge, it can be argued that moral philosophers have a specialist status in
deliberative bodies in providing certain aspects of specialist knowledge about
morality. In this last section, we briefly outline how and why these clarifications
about moral expertise can now be made.
The theory of expertises allows for expertise to exist across a very broad range of
human activity, from ubiquitous activities such as walking or crossing the street,
through to specialist activities such as computer programming and quantum physics.
This stands in contrast to Archard’s [1] claim that ‘[e]xpertise is exclusionary and
restricted’. When it comes to contextualising this general theory of expertise, the
central question is ‘who knows what they are talking about?’. In applying this to the
case of moral expertise, it would seem that what moral philosophers do and what
laypeople do is remarkably similar—they exercise moral judgements based on
common-sense ideas about morality. In this regard, we agree with Archard’s [1]
analysis that ‘moral philosophers share with non-philosophers a general or basic
moral knowledge’ and that ‘philosophers do not command a comprehensive
knowledge within the domain of normative judgements denied to non-philoso-
phers’. Where, however, Archard sees this as supporting his view that moral
philosophers cannot be moral experts on the grounds that they do not possess an
ability to make judgements that non-philosophers somehow cannot make, on the
Collins and Evans’ model of expertise this is what establishes both the moral
philosopher and the lay-person as being able to lay claim to moral expertise.
The ultimate factor is that moral expertise resides in an ability to determine what
to do with our knowledge of moral issues; it is the ability and capacity to exercise
moral judgement. One does not need to be a moral philosopher in order to do this—
many people exercise this capacity on a regular basis and hence allow a claim that
there are levels of ubiquitous moral expertise that are widely distributed throughout
society. However, in order to be able to fully endorse this view in the case of moral
expertise we need to clarify the second point: that this view is not a blanket claim
that everyone’s moral judgements are as good as everyone else’s or that laypersons
are similarly situated to moral philosophers.
Let us separate two aspects of what is entailed in exercising moral judgement.
Firstly, there is the capacity in which most rational agents exercise moral
judgements in order to make decisions on a wide range of normative matters in
everyday life. This is a form of ubiquitous expertise shared by most people in
society. Whether people agree or disagree with each other over the specific moral
decisions made by others is largely irrelevant for the exercise of this skill. The point
is that making moral judgements is embedded in a wide range of our social
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activities. As such, the tacit knowledge necessary for processing morally relevant
information and making judgements accordingly is possessed by a large proportion
of the population. However, the question before us is whether moral decision-
making could also admit of a more specialist character, for example, as is practised
in making complex or highly formalised normative judgements that is required in
deliberative bodies. There is no doubt that it can be claimed such work entails some
kind of specialism, but importantly, the issue is how this can both afford the moral
philosopher a specialist status in the relevant expert community while not
precluding non-moral philosophers from being considered moral experts.
Under the Collins and Evans’ account, expertise is determined through the
acquisition of tacit knowledge which can be obtained only by those who immerse
themselves in the relevant domain and group. The specialist domain of ethical
deliberative decision-making bodies is populated by people who have ‘tapped into’
this reservoir of tacit knowledge about how to exercise moral judgements in this
regard. This is not to say that simply joining such a body automatically makes one a
specialist expert, only that it is the route to becoming such an expert. Once part of
such a body, an individual is socially immersed in the range of activities and
practices that make one an effective member of a deliberative body. Although some
of this might involve the acquisition of explicit knowledge, such as information
about regulations, resources, political and public opinions, and so forth, expertise
amounts to more than this because it is the product of the tacit knowledge one
acquires in that field. Such tacit knowledge can be extremely subtle in nature and
may not be discernible to a non-expert but it is precisely the acquisition of this sort
of tacit knowledge that marks out the expert from the non-expert [19]. The tacit
knowledge involved in sitting on deliberative bodies is therefore expertise in a
specialist sense because the sort of tacit knowledge required is only to be gained
from experiencing the activities and practices that take place in such bodies.
This also feeds into the third and fourth points raised as to the nature of moral
expertise by allowing both moral philosophers and non-philosophers alike to lay
claim to moral expertise in this specialist sense. Exercising moral judgement,
knowing what we should do with the information we have about an issue, is
something that people may be better or worse at. It may even be something that the
moral philosopher has some advantage in doing well given the amount of time they
spend in considering matters of morality. However, an argument as to how moral
philosophers might lay claim to possessing specialism would look like this:
Knowing a great deal about moral theory or philosophical method is not what
constitutes possession of the requisite tacit knowledge about moral decision-
making; rather the relevant tacit knowledge here consists of knowing how to
implement and apply explicit knowledge of moral matters to the issue at hand.
Of course, much hangs on what this explicit knowledge of morally relevant
matters is but this is not the central concern as to what determines expertise. This
may still leave a genuine confusion as to what role moral philosophers could lay
claim to that is in any way different from any other moral expert. This is the fifth
and final point that needs clarification.
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Although it is true that most people have a ubiquitous form of moral expertise and that
some also have a specialist expertise suited to moral decision-making on deliberative
bodies, moral philosophers can be distinguished further in terms of being able to provide
certain aspects of specialist knowledge, such as the analytical skills pinpointed by Singer.
This, however, is the provision of a specialist technical role that moral philosophers may
play in deliberative bodies by providing explanation of, for example, consistency in moral
reasoning or the implications of pursuing a particular theoretical line, rather than a
necessary component of what constitutes expertise itself. Certainly, one may be an expert
moral philosopher through possession of the tacit knowledge acquired through social
immersion in the field of moral philosophy that gives the explicit knowledge of, for
example, moral theory and logical argument, its meaning. This is what demarcates
someone who has grasped elements of explicit knowledge about moral philosophy from
an expert moral philosopher: only the moral philosopher has tacit knowledge that allows
them, for example, to know when to take a particular journal article or author seriously,
how to convey an advancement in moral argument to a philosophy conference, or to
recognise patterns in critical approaches to certain types of moral argument. These
elements may never be written down as explicit, were that even possible in all cases, but
knowing them is the product of tacit knowledge acquired in the field of moral philosophy
which is unavailable to others. It is therefore possible to argue that the moral philosopher
holds a particular status in an expert community through the possession of specialist tacit
knowledge in the nature of ethical reasoning that others may not be able to provide, even
with specialist expertise in an area involving moral deliberation.
Conclusion
We have arrived at a point where it is both possible and plausible to claim that moral
philosophers are moral experts. Importantly, this does not entail saying that moral
philosophers are the ultimate source of authority on morality, or that laypersons lack
expertise. Accepting that morality is a ubiquitous disposition and undoubtedly a talent
that we can (and desirably will) develop; it seems problematic to claim that ordinary
people lack any expertise in matters of morality. It may be that some better exhibit the
kinds of skills and dispositions that are necessary for robust moral judgment and some to
a far lesser degree so that we might think their decision-making process lacking. While
moral philosophers may be uncomfortable with their skills in morality being seen as no
different in substance to laypersons we should not be quick to say that all laypersons are
equal in moral reasoning. Instead a more dynamic evaluation of expertise is needed to
deal with different competencies and skills. This evaluation, in turn, will reveal what it is
in terms of specialist skills and knowledge that expert moral philosophers can contribute
to ethical decision-making on matters of public policy.
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